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Record numbers of negative television ads aired in 2018, no doubt reflecting the increase in the number of
competitive congressional races across the country. Digital advertising, as the Wesleyan Media Project noted,
was also on the rise, but campaigns and their surrogates had not by any means abandoned the 30-second

television spot. Nearly half of those ads that aired were purely negative, and all told, 7 of 10 ads contained an
attack. Such negativity is not new nor is scholarly interest in the effects of attack advertising. But to date,
political scientists have puzzled over mixed findings. Are negative ads more effective, persuading Americans to
vote for one candidate over another? Does such negativity demobilize the electorate and debase political
discourse? Kim Fridkin and Patrick Kenney, outstanding scholars of modern campaigns, offer a nuanced take on
these questions, putting forth a theoretical framework that improves our understanding of how negative
campaigning affects the beliefs and behaviors of Americans.
In Fridkin and Kenney’s framework, which they coin the “tolerance and tactics theory of negativity,” both voters
and the messages matter. Individuals vary in their tolerance for negativity. Some are comfortable with strident
and even personal attacks on the political opposition; others find negative attacks off-putting or unpleasant.
Tactics differ too, with substantial variation in the tone and content of negative messages. Negative ads might
include ad hominem attacks or focus on important policy matters. Fridkin and Kenney argue that we can better
understand the effects of negative campaigning by jointly considering voters’ tolerance for negativity and
campaigns’ tactics for attacking the opposition. They hypothesize that the most persuasive negative ads are
harsh in tone (uncivil) and deliver politically meaningful content about the risk of supporting a candidate
(relevant). They also posit that negativity can, under some conditions, damage the body politic, with uncivil,
irrelevant messages turning Americans off from politics and away from the polls. Crucially, they argue that both
sets of effects will be concentrated among those least tolerant of negativity in politics.
Fridkin and Kenney employ a diverse array of research designs to test each aspect of their theory. Individuals’
tolerance for negativity is examined using survey data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study
(CCES). A thorough content analysis of ads aired in the 2014 US Senate elections reveals how negative ads vary
in tone and substance. Perceptions of the civility and relevance in negative advertising are assessed with the
help of focus groups and survey experiments; facial recognition software is used to look at people’s emotional
reactions to negative ads. Finally, they match CCES respondents to their actual campaign environments to test
their hypotheses about how negativity relates to people’s assessments of candidates and decisions to
participate.
They find that individuals’ tolerance of negativity varies systematically with political and demographic
characteristics. Women, older Americans, and the less politically interested tend to express much less tolerance.
And though their earlier work suggests that Republicans are more tolerant of negativity than Democrats, they do
not find a consistent relationship between tolerance and ideology or strength of partisanship. Interestingly,
although there is variation in the civility and relevance of negative ads, those sponsored by outside groups in
2014 did not look markedly different from those sponsored by candidates or parties.
Their findings, however, are most compelling when they bring both pieces of their framework together. Using
facial recognition software, for example, Fridkin and Kenney test individuals’ emotional reactions to campaign
messages. The results are consistent with their theory: uncivil and relevant messages register the strongest
emotional reactions, but only among subjects who scored low in tolerance for negativity. In their matched CCES
analysis, they show that uncivil and relevant negative ads tend to lower evaluations of the attacked candidate,
but only among Americans with a low tolerance for negativity; whether negative ads are uncivil, relevant, or
both bears no statistically significant relationship to candidate evaluations among high-tolerance Americans.
Fridkin and Kenney’s central argument is that individuals low in tolerance for negativity will be most sensitive to
the tone and substance of negative ads. Their turnout models are in line with that expectation: those who do
not think that negative attacks are fair game tend to be less likely to go to the polls when they see lots of uncivil
and irrelevant attack ads. But their findings on the persuasiveness of negative ads bear some additional
consideration. If voters are not tolerant of these kinds of messages, why are they more (not less) likely to be

persuaded by them? Alternatively, it could be that low-tolerance voters are more likely to punish sponsors of
negative ads, thereby reducing the net effectiveness of negative campaigning. In previous work, Fridkin and
Kenney, along with several others, have shown that negative ads can generate a backlash against the candidate
who sponsors or is helped by the attack. Although low-tolerance Americans appear to give greater weight to
shrill attacks about a candidate’s policy stands or legislative votes, Fridkin and Kenney do not test whether these
potential voters also punish the candidate behind the attack.
If I have one critique of the empirical analyses in the book, it is that they have not taken full advantage of their
experimental design (chap. 6) to assess how people react to ads that vary in civility. In an experiment embedded
in the CCES, Fridkin and Kenney manipulated the storyboards of real negative ads. As expected, ads manipulated
to be uncivil were generally rated as less civil (though they find no treatment effect on perceptions of an ad’s
relevance). What remains untested, however, is whether their civility treatment has any effect on the outcome
of interest—that is, individuals’ impressions of the candidates—or whether their treatment interacts with an
individual’s level of tolerance for negativity, as their theory suggests. It is possible that their experimental
treatment, which does not always pass the manipulation check, is too weak to detect any such effects.
This book provides a comprehensive examination of negative advertising, and its theoretical framework will
likely be taken up by many in the field. In the end, Fridkin and Kenney concur that “America’s campaigns…do not
fulfill the democratic ideal of generating thoughtful, reasoned, balanced, reflective, and prospective debate and
discussion” (p. 160). Reviewing their results and the tenor of the 2016 presidential election in the conclusion,
they suggest that we might be at a tipping point, at which negative advertising in future campaigns will do more
harm than good. It is not clear that all readers will share that interpretation. If there is a silver lining here, it is
that few negative ads can be characterized as pure mudslinging; indeed, their coders rated roughly 90% of
negative ads aired in the 2014 Senate elections as relevant to voters’ worries or interests. But Americans
generally disfavor negativity in politics, and it should be deeply disconcerting both that the less politically
interested report even greater intolerance for negativity and that campaign rhetoric appears to do little to
engage these potential voters in democratic life. Fridkin and Kenney have brought fresh insight and a wealth of
data into debates about the consequences of negative campaigning for the quality of representative democracy.
This book will be a great addition to graduate seminars and upper-division undergraduate courses on
campaigns, elections, and research methods.

